https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=05_ruP3anXA
https://www.vox.com/2018/2/2/16957588/nunes-memo-released-full-text-read-pdf-declassified
Secret House memo released: the fallout, the lies, and the bigger picture
https://jonrappoport.wordpress.com/2018/02/05/secret-house-memo-released-the-fallout-the-lies-and-the-bigger-picture/
HOw and Why Jews Have Sacrificed Non-=Jewsh Chilren as Part of Eheir Religion4
In 1999 800.000 children went missing/ 2300 children go missing each day in this country.
http://beforeitsnews.com/alternative/2018/02/how-and-why-jews-have-sacrificed-non-jewish-children-as-part-of-their-religion-3593315.html
Turmeric Extract May Prevent or even Reverse Diabetes (Type 1 and 2)
http://beforeitsnews.com/alternative/2018/02/turmeric-extract-may-prevent-even-reverse-diabetes-type-1-and-2-3593392.html


James E. Boasberg District of Columbia / D.C. May 19, 2014 March 18, 2021
Rudolph Contreras District of Columbia / D.C. May 19, 2016 May 18, 2023
Anne C. Conway Middle District of Florida / 11th May 19, 2016 May 18, 2023
Raymond J. Dearie Eastern District of New York / 2nd July 2, 2012 July 1, 2019
Claire V. Eagan Northern District of Oklahoma / 10th February 13, 2013 May 18, 2019
James P. Jones Western District of Virginia /4th May 19, 2015 May 18, 2022
Robert B. Kugler District of New Jersey / 3rd May 19, 2017 May 18, 2024
Michael W. Mosman District of Oregon / 9th May 04, 2013 May 03, 2020
Thomas B. Russell Western District of Kentucky / 6th May 19, 2015 May 18, 2022
F. Dennis Saylor IV District of Massachusetts / 1st May 19, 2011 May 18, 2018

Collyer, Rosemary M.
Born 1945 in Port Chester, MD
Federal Judicial Service:
Judge, U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia
Nominated by George W. Bush on August 1, 2002, to a seat vacated by Thomas Penfield Jackson. Confirmed by the Senate on November 14, 2002, and received commission on November 15, 2002. Assumed senior status on May 18, 2016. 
Other Federal Judicial Service:
Judge, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 2013-present; presiding judge, 2016-present
Judge, Alien Terrorist Removal Court, 2016-present; chief judge, 2016-present
Boasberg, James Emanuel
Born 1963 in San Francisco, CA
Federal Judicial Service:
Judge, U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia
Nominated by Barack Obama on January 5, 2011, to a seat vacated by Thomas F. Hogan. Confirmed by the Senate on March 14, 2011, and received commission on March 17, 2011. 
Other Federal Judicial Service:
Judge, Superior Court of the District of Columbia, 2002-2011
Judge, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 2014-present
Contreras, Rudolph
Born 1962 in Staten Island, NY
Federal Judicial Service:
Judge, U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia
Nominated by Barack Obama on July 28, 2011, to a seat vacated by Ricardo M. Urbina. Confirmed by the Senate on March 22, 2012, and received commission on March 23, 2012. 
Other Federal Judicial Service:
Judge, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 2016-present
Conway, Anne C.
Born 1950 in Cleveland, OH
Federal Judicial Service:
Judge, U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida
Nominated by George H.W. Bush on July 24, 1991, to a seat vacated by George C. Carr. Confirmed by the Senate on November 21, 1991, and received commission on November 25, 1991. Served as chief judge, 2008-2015. Assumed senior status on August 1, 2015. 
Other Federal Judicial Service:
Judge, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 2016-present
Dearie, Raymond Joseph
Born 1944 in Rockville Center, NY
Federal Judicial Service:
Judge, U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York
Nominated by Ronald Reagan on February 3, 1986, to a new seat authorized by 98 Stat. 333. Confirmed by the Senate on March 14, 1986, and received commission on March 19, 1986. Served as chief judge, 2007-2011. Assumed senior status on April 3, 2011. 
Other Federal Judicial Service:
Judge, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 2012-present
Eagan, Claire
Born 1950 in Bronx, NY
Federal Judicial Service:
Judge, U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma
Nominated by George W. Bush on September 4, 2001, to a seat vacated by Thomas Rutherford Brett. Confirmed by the Senate on October 23, 2001, and received commission on October 24, 2001. Served as chief judge, 2005-2012. 
Other Federal Judicial Service:
U.S. Magistrate Judge, U.S. District Court, Northern District of Oklahoma, 1998-2001
Judge, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 2013-present
Jones, James Parker
Born 1940 in Tampa, FL
Federal Judicial Service:
Judge, U.S. District Court for the Western District of Virginia
Nominated by William J. Clinton on December 12, 1995, to a seat vacated by James H. Michael, Jr. Confirmed by the Senate on July 18, 1996, and received commission on August 1, 1996. Served as chief judge, 2004-2010. 
Other Federal Judicial Service:
Judge, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 2015-present
Judge, Alien Terrorist Removal Court, 2016-present
Kugler, Robert B.
Born 1950 in Camden, NJ
Federal Judicial Service:
Judge, U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey
Nominated by George W. Bush on August 1, 2002, to a seat vacated by Joseph E. Irenas. Confirmed by the Senate on November 14, 2002, and received commission on December 4, 2002. 
Other Federal Judicial Service:
U.S. Magistrate Judge, U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey, 1992-2002
Judge, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 2017-present
Mosman, Michael W.
Born 1956 in Eugene, OR
Federal Judicial Service:
Judge, U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon
Nominated by George W. Bush on May 8, 2003, to a seat vacated by Robert E. Jones. Confirmed by the Senate on September 25, 2003, and received commission on September 26, 2003. Served as chief judge, 2016-present. 

Russell, Thomas B.
Born 1945 in Louisville, KY
Federal Judicial Service:
Judge, U.S. District Court for the Western District of Kentucky
Nominated by William J. Clinton on September 14, 1994, to a seat vacated by Edward H. Johnstone. Confirmed by the Senate on October 7, 1994, and received commission on October 11, 1994. Served as chief judge, 2008-2011. Assumed senior status on November 15, 2011. 
Saylor, F. Dennis IV
Born 1955 in Royal Oak, MI
Federal Judicial Service:
Judge, U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts
Nominated by George W. Bush on July 30, 2003, to a seat vacated by Robert E. Keeton. Confirmed by the Senate on June 1, 2004, and received commission on June 2, 2004. 
Other Federal Judicial Service:
Judge, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 2011-present


http://www.conspirazzi.com/category/rothschilds/page/2/
1. The United States individual (personal) income taxes go directly to the Bank of England, City of London, which is wholly owned and controlled by the family Rothschild.
2. The United States Federal Reserve Bank is NOT a U.S. government institution.
3. The Federal Reserve is a PRIVATE bank, which is wholly owned and controlled by the family Rothschild.
4. The Federal Reserve was established in 1913 illegally, when the Rothschild’s lieutenant, U.S. Senator Nelson Aldrich, forced through a Congressional bill that mandated it.
5. The family Rothschild is directly responsible for starting all major, and many minor, wars over the past 230 years.
6. The family Rothschild is directly responsible for every recession and depression in the United States over the past 210 years.
7. The family Rothschild (The First Sphere of Influence) controls all major banking throughout the entire world, and has the power to bankrupt entire countries.
8. Thomas Jefferson fought vehemently against Alexander Hamilton to ensure that the newly created United States would NOT fall under the control of the Rothschilds. Jefferson said that the Rothschilds were a greater threat to our country than any standing army.
9. Andrew Jackson also fought to thwart all the efforts of the Rothschilds, and was able to do so during his term. When his term was up, the Rothschilds installed their own U.S. president and then, in a retaliatory measure, plunged America into its first depression.
10. The Rothschilds have assassinated four U.S. presidents, who refused to toe the Rothschild line, and are thought to have murdered others, although the evidence for the latter is as yet inconclusive.
11. BONUS FACT #1: the Rothschilds are wholly responsible for the deaths and murders and assassinations of tens of millions of human beings worldwide.
12. BONUS FACT #2: The Rothschild henchmen are Zbigniew Brzezinski and his sons. Forget Kissinger; he’s an idiot.
The current structure of the Treasury Solicitor’s Division compromises of four (4) legal officers and one (1) support staff. The Division is headed by the Treasury Solicitor with three other posts of Senior State Counsel, State Counsel II and State Counsel I. All positions are currently filled.
Treasury Solicitor with three other posts of Senior State Counsel, State Counsel II and State Counsel I. All positions are currently filled.
Treasury Solicitor. He has the formal title of Her Majesty's Procurator General and Treasury Solicitor. Currently, the office is held by Jonathan Jones. 
I.
Hon. Jayantha Chandrasiri Jayasuriya, President's Counsel, was appointed as Attorney General on 10th February 2016

⦁ Provides legal advice to all Divisions compromising the Customs and Excise Division, the Treasury Division (Comptroller of Accounts), the Inland Revenue Division., the Valuations Division and the Central Tenders Board. 
⦁ Advises the Ministry on the legal effectiveness of fiscal policies formulated by the Ministry and prepares Briefs for the Minister on legislation and other matters which have an impact on the fiscal/ financial affairs of the State. 
⦁ Provides legal advice on matters dealt with by other Ministries of Government which have a fiscal/ financial impact. 
⦁ Advises the Minister on other legal documents which are required to be executed by the Minister or which may have a revenue/fiscal impact. 
⦁ Is involved in the negotiation of double taxation treaties with other countries as well as other agreements involving foreign investors.
Disclosure
The advice provided by the Treasury Solicitor’s Division is highly confidential and is subject to legal professional privilege.

Address
Trinidad and Tobago
Eric Williams Finance Building
Independence Square,
Port of Spain, 

The Bank of Credit and Commerce International S.A. ("B.C.C.I."), a Luxembourg corporation, had carried on business in the United Kingdom as a deposit taking institution before the Act of 1979 came into force. When the Act of 1979 came into force B.C.C.I. came under the aegis of the new system. In June 1980 the Bank of England granted a licence to carry on business as a deposit-taking institution to B.C.C.I. Until 5 July 1991 B.C.C.I. carried on business at its principal place of business in the City of London, and at many branches elsewhere in the United Kingdom.
The ingredients of the tort
It is now possible to consider the ingredients of the tort. That can conveniently be done by stating the requirements of the tort in a logical sequence of numbered paragraphs.
(1) The defendant must be a public officer:
It is the office in a relatively wide sense on which everything depends. Thus a local authority exercising private-law functions as a landlord is potentially capable of being sued: Jones v. Swansea City Council. In the present case it is common ground that the Bank satisfies this requirement. 
(2) The second requirement is the exercise of power as a public officer:
This ingredient is also not in issue. The conduct of the named senior officials of the Banking Supervision Department of the Bank was in the exercise of public functions. Moreover, it is not disputed that the principles of vicarious liability apply as much to misfeasance in public office as to other torts involving malice, knowledge or intention: Racz v. Home Office [1994] 2 A.C. 45.
(3) The third requirement concerns the state of mind of the defendant.
The case law reveals two different forms of liability for misfeasance in public office. First there is the case of targeted malice by a public officer i.e. conduct specifically intended to injure a person or persons. This type of case involves bad faith in the sense of the exercise of public power for an improper or ulterior motive. The second form is where a public officer acts knowing that he has no power to do the act complained of and that the act will probably injure the plaintiff. It involves bad faith inasmuch as the public officer does not have an honest belief that his act is lawful.
The distinction, and the availability of an action of the second type, was inherent in the early development of tort. A group of cases which began with Ashby v. White (1703), reported in 1 Smith's Leading Cases (13th ed.) 253, concerned the discretionary refusal of voting rights: see also Drewe v. Coulton (1787) 1 East 563n; 102 E.R. 217; Tozer v. Child (1857) 7 El. & Bl. 377: 119 E.R. 1286; Cullen v. Morris (1819) 2 Stark 577; 171 E.R. 741. In the second group of cases the defendants were judges of inferior courts, and the cases concerned liability of the judges for malicious acts within their jurisdiction: Ackerley v. Parkinson (1815) 3 M. & S. 411; 105 E.R. 665; Harman v. Tappenden (1801) 1 East 555; 102 E.R. 214; Taylor v. Nesfield (1854) 3 El. & Bl. 724; 118 E.R. 1312. These decisions laid the foundation of the modern tort; they established the two different forms of liability; and revealed the unifying element of conduct amounting to an abuse of power accompanied by subjective bad faith. In the most important modern case in England the existence of the two forms of the tort was analysed and affirmed: Bourgoin S.A. v. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food [1986] Q.B. 716. Clarke J. followed this traditional twofold classification. He expressly held that the two forms are alternative ways in which the tort can be committed. The majority in the Court of Appeal commented on "a rather rigid distinction between the two supposed limbs of the tort" and observed that there was "the need to establish deliberate and dishonest abuse of power in every case:" [2000] 2 W.L.R. 15 at 67C-D. As a matter of classification it is certainly right to say that there are not two separate torts. On the other hand, the ingredients of the two forms of the tort cannot be exactly the same because if that were so there would be no sense in the twofold classification. Undoubtedly there are unifying features, namely the special nature of the tort, as directed against the conduct of public officers only, and the element of an abuse of public power in bad faith. But there are differences between the alternative forms of the tort and it is conducive to clarity to recognise this.
The present case is not one of targeted malice. If the action in tort is maintainable it must be in the second form of the tort. It is therefore necessary to consider the distinctive features of this form of the tort. The remainder of my judgment will be directed to this form of the tort.
The basis for the action lies in the defendant taking a decision in the knowledge that it is an excess of the powers granted to him and that it is likely to cause damage to an individual or individuals. It is, not every act beyond the powers vesting in a public officer which will ground the tort. The alternative form of liability requires an element of bad faith. This leads to what was a disputed issue. Counsel for the Bank pointed out that there was no precedent in England before the present case which held recklessness to be a sufficient state of mind to ground the tort. Counsel argued that recklessness was insufficient. The Australian High Court and the Court of Appeal of New Zealand have ruled that recklessness is sufficient: Northern Territory v. Mengel (1995) 69 A.J.L.R. 527; Garrett v. Attorney-General [1997] 2 N.Z.L.R. 332; Rawlinson v. Rice [1997] 2 N.Z.L.R. 651. Clarke J. lucidly explained the reason for the inclusion of recklessness [1996] 3 All E.R. 558, 581:
"The reason why recklessness was regarded as sufficient by all members of the High Court in Mengel is perhaps most clearly seen in the judgment of Brennan J. It is that misfeasance consists in the purported exercise of a power otherwise than in an honest attempt to perform the relevant duty. It is that lack of honesty which makes the act an abuse of power."
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199900/ldjudgmt/jd000518/rivers-1.htm
(4) Duty to the plaintiff
The question is who can sue in respect of an abuse of power by a public officer. Counsel for the Bank argued that in order to be able to claim in respect of the second form of misfeasance, there must be established "an antecedent legal right or interest" and an element of "proximity". Clarke J. did not enunciate a requirement of proximity. He observed [1996] 3 All E.R. 558, 584B):
"If an officer deliberately does an act which he knows is unlawful and will cause economic loss to the plaintiff, I can see no reason in principle why the plaintiff should identify a legal right which is being infringed or a particular duty owed to him, beyond the right not to be damaged or injured by a deliberate abuse of power by a public officer" 
The majority in the Court of Appeal held that "the notion of proximity should have a significant part to play in the tort of misfeasance, as it undoubtedly has in the tort of negligence:" [2000] 2 W.L.R. 15, 66A. Counsel for the Bank argued that both requirements are essential in order to prevent the tort from becoming an uncontrollable one. It would be unwise to make general statements on a subject which may involve many diverse situations. What can be said is that, of course, any plaintiff must have a sufficient interest to found a legal standing to sue. Subject to this qualification, principle does not require the introduction of proximity as a controlling mechanism in this corner of the law. The state of mind required to establish the tort, as already explained, as well as the special rule of remoteness hereafter discussed, keeps the tort within reasonable bounds. There is no reason why such an action cannot be brought by a particular class of persons, such as depositors at a bank, even if their precise identities were not known to the bank. The observations of Clarke J. are correct.
In agreed issue 4 the question is raised whether the Bank is capable of being liable for the tort of misfeasance in public office to plaintiffs who were potentially depositors at the time of any relevant act or omission of misfeasance by the Bank. The majority in the Court of Appeal and Auld L.J. held that this issue is unsuitable for summary determination. In my view this ruling was correct.
(5) Causation
Causation is an essential element of the plaintiffs' cause of action. It is a question of fact. The majority in the Court of Appeal and Auld L.J. held that it is unsuitable for summary determination. That is plainly correct. This conclusion disposes of agreed issue 3 so far as it relates to the tort of misfeasance.
(6) Damage and Remoteness
The claims by the plaintiffs are in respect of financial losses they suffered. These are, of course, claims for recovery of consequential economic losses. The question is when such losses are recoverable. It would have been possible, as a matter of classification, to discuss this question under paragraph 3 in which the required state of mind for this tort was examined. It is, however, convenient to consider it under the traditional heading of remoteness.
On the assumption that the other requirements can be established, counsel for the plaintiffs argued that the plaintiffs should be able to recover all reasonably foreseeable losses suffered by them. In support of this argument he had the advantage of a powerfully reasoned dissenting judgment by Auld L.J. Counsel for the Bank argued that the rule is more restrictive. He supported the conclusion of the majority in the Court of Appeal. The judge had held that the plaintiffs must prove that the Bank actually foresaw the losses to the plaintiff as a probable consequence. This part of the judgment at first instance provided the reason for the judge refusing to allow the proposed amendments and striking out the claims. The majority observed [2000] 2 W.L.R. 15, 102A:
"[The] formulation, however, may have been too favourable to the plaintiffs. In view of the stringent requirements of the tort of misfeasance in public office, the more appropriate question may be: Is it reasonably arguable that the Bank at any stage made an unlawful and dishonest decision knowing at the time that it would cause loss to the plaintiffs? To that question, in the light of our analysis of the evidence, the answer is plainly 'No.'" 
Counsel adopted this formulation as his primary submission. In the alternative he submitted that the test stated by Clarke J. should be adopted.
It will be necessary to give a brief account of the decisions in which this issue was considered. It was first touched on in Bourgoin S.A. v. Ministry of Agriculture [1986] Q.B. 716. At first instance Mann J. had spoken of foreseeable losses. Oliver L.J. quoted and endorsed the relevant passage. In Northern Territory v. Mengel 69 A.L.J.R. 527, at 540 the majority in the Australian High Court adopted a test of "a foreseeable risk of harm" for which it relied on Bourgoin. In the present case Clarke J. concluded that in using the word "foreseeable" in Bourgoin Mann J. must have meant "foreseen" and that the same applies to the adoption of the relevant passage by Oliver L.J. Before the judgments in the Court of Appeal in the present case the Court of Appeal of New Zealand adopted the conclusions of Clarke J. as well as his explanation of Bourgoin: Garrett v. Attorney-General [1997] 2 N.Z.L.R. 332; Rawlinson v. Rice [1997] 2 N.Z.L.R. 651. In England the Court of Appeal and Divisional Court have on a number of occasions approved the reasoning of Clarke J. These decisions include the following: Lam v. Brennan [1997] 3 P.L.R. 22 (C.A.); Reg. v. Chief Constable of the North Wales Police, Ex parte A.B. [1999] Q.B. 396 (D.C.); Barnard v. Restormel Borough Council [1998] 3 P.L.R. 27 (C.A.); W. v. Essex County Council [1999] Fam. 90 (C.A.) While it is unnecessary to discuss these decisions it is relevant to point out that in the North Wales Police case the Lord Chief Justice expressed agreement with the view that the tort is only established if the officer had knowledge that he had no power to do the act complained of and that the act would probably injure the plaintiff. He paid tribute to the "extended consideration and most helpful summary" by Clarke J. at [1999] Q.B. 396, 413B. 
 
Mark Carney   McCafferty
Program Details
Episode S7E7
Broadcast Week Feb 4th 2018
Duration 00:58:26
Audience Rating TV-G
Genre Newsmagazine
Theme Community Issues & Advocacy
Language English
  On Archive.org

Back to top